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This paper studies correlation in discounted in￿nitely repeated games with public
monitoring. Two extensions of the perfect public equilibrium are proposed: the public
correlated equilibrium, where a correlation device sends private correlated messages
to the players at the beginning of each period, and the public augmented equilibrium,
where the device also publicly informs the players of the recommended action pro￿le
at the end of each period. The set of public correlated equilibrium payo⁄s is compared
to the set of subgame perfect publicly correlated equilibrium payo⁄s in the perfect
monitoring case. It is shown that augmented correlation produces e¢ ciency gains in
the repeated partnership game by Radner et al. (1986).
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21 Introduction
This paper studies discounted in￿nitely repeated n-player games with public moni-
toring, endowed with an extensive form correlation device. This structure captures
situations of repeated interaction among players who choose their actions conditional
on both public and correlated private information.
A general framework for the analysis of repeated games with imperfect public
monitoring was provided by Abreu et al. (1990) (APS). Building on their work,
Fudenberg et al. (1994) have shown that imperfect monitoring imposes essentially
no restriction on the set of equilibrium payo⁄s if the signal space is large enough.
Otherwise, the equilibrium payo⁄ set may be bounded away from the Pareto frontier
even as the discount factor tends to one (Radner et al. 1986; Fudenberg at al.
1994, pp. 1003-04). This ine¢ ciency disappears if communication among players
is allowed and the number of players is at least four (Kandori 2003). Sometimes
e¢ ciency can be improved by employing private strategies which depend not only on
the history of public signals but also on players￿own actions in the past (Kandori and
Obara 2006a). Another approach to dealing with the ine¢ cency problem is based on
assuming reduced sensitivity of the public signal to the hidden actions of the players
(Kandori and Obara 2006b).
The focus of this paper is also on in￿nitely repeated games with imperfect public
monitoring. Following Forges (1986) and Lehrer (1992), we add an extensive form
correlation device to the in￿nitely repeated game. The device selects a vector of
messages, one for each player, in every period of the game, based on the history
of public signals. In our setting, the device is not a communication device since
it does not receive any inputs from players (Myerson 1986; Tomala 2005). Players
condition their play in every period on (i) the history of public signals and (ii) the
3latest private message of the device. The distribution according to which the device
randomly selects its recommendations in every period depends only on the history
of realizations of the public signal. As a result, each non-empty public history may
be treated as if it gives rise to a proper subgame. In repeated games with perfect
monitoring, a related solution concept is that of subgame perfect publicly correlated
equilibrium by Myerson (1991, p. 334), where, in every period, the correlation device
publicly recommends an action pro￿le to the players.
In the APS spirit, we decompose an equilibrium payo⁄ vector into an admissible
pair consisting of a probability distribution on the product of the players￿action
sets and a continuation value function. This extension leads to a number of useful
characterizations of the set of public correlated equilibrium payo⁄s.
We then introduce augmented correlation devices. In every period, these devices
￿rst send players private recommendations and, after the players have moved, publicly
inform them of the whole recommended action pro￿le. Obviously, in the perfect mon-
itoring case, the corresponding equilibrium payo⁄ set contains both the set of public
correlated equilibrium payo⁄s and the set of subgame perfect public randomization
(publicly correlated) equilibrium payo⁄s. However, the opportunities opened up by
augmented correlation are not con￿ned to introducing public randomization e⁄ects
into the model. Augmentation enriches public histories with previously recommended
action pro￿les and makes it easier to identify deviators.
A similar enrichment of public histories results from asking the players to publicly
announce which actions they have just taken at the end of each period. However,
ensuring players￿truth telling leads to additional conditions on the number of players
(Kandori 2003). In its turn, augmentation is not about the action pro￿le just chosen
by the players: the mediator publicly announce its own private recommendations
to the players at the end of each period. As we will show below by example, such
4"leaks" of players￿private information may lead to improved e¢ ciency in repeated
games with imperfect public monitoring.
In Example 1, we study an in￿nitely repeated prisoners￿dilemma game with per-
fect monitoring. For a ￿xed discount factor, we show that the corresponding set of
subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s is a proper subset of the
set of public correlated equilibrium payo⁄s. That is, imperfect correlation may pro-
duce more e¢ cient outcomes than perfect correlation. The intution behind this is
that of Aumann (1974)￿ s, but applied to the in￿nitely repeated game. At the same
time, it is worth noting that the stage game of the repeated game has a unique Nash
equilibrium. In general, the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium
payo⁄s may strictly contain the set of public correlated equilibrium payo⁄s since the
history of past public messages is common knowledge in the presence of a public
randomization device.
As we show for an in￿nitely repeated prisoners￿dilemma game (Example 2), ex-
tensive form correlation alone may produce no e¢ ciency improvement if public mon-
itoring is imperfect and the signal space is small. However, by publicly announcing
the most recent private recommendations at the end of each period, the mediator can
reduce the welfare loss caused by the imperfect observability of actions.
2 Theoretical Underpinnings
In the stage game GY; players move simultaneously, and player i 2 N = f1;:::;ng
chooses an action ai from a ￿nite set Ai. Every pro￿le of actions a 2 A = ￿
i2N
Ai
induces a probability distribution on Y = fy1;:::;yrg; the ￿nite set of publicly ob-
servable signals. Let p(y j a) denote the probability of y 2 Y given a 2 A. The stage
game payo⁄function for player i is given by ￿i(ai;y). Player i￿ s expected stage game





The repeated game G1
Y (￿) begins at time 0, with the null history h0 = f?g.
Let Hk
Y denote the set of all possible period-k public histories hk
Y = fy0;:::;yk￿1g.
Players discount future payo⁄s with a common discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1); and player







where ak refers to the action pro￿le chosen in period k: Adding the subscript "Y "
to G emphasizes that actions are imperfectly observed. However, the formulation
also encompasses the case of perfect observability of actions. So, with a slight abuse
of notation, we will denote by gi player i￿ s payo⁄ function in repeated games with
perfectly observable actions as well.
2.1 Correlation Devices
An extensive form correlation device C sends separately and con￿dentially messages
to the players at the beginning of each period. Formally, C = ((Mi)i2N;￿) is an
(n + 1)-tuple consisting of a family of ￿nite message sets Mi and a map ￿ acts from





Y of public histories to the set 4(M) of probability distributions
on M = ￿
i2N
Mi. The map ￿ is common knowledge among the players. Let ￿(m =
(m1;:::;mn) j hY) denote the conditional probability that the correlation device will
send each player i message mi at hY. After public history hY, the device selects
m = (m1;:::;mn) 2 M according to ￿(￿ j hY) and privately informs each player i of
6mi. A strategy for player i is a map fi from HY ￿ Mi to 4(Ai). Let fi(ai j hY;mi)
represent the probability that player i will choose ai conditional on hY and mi. For
a correlation device C and a strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn), we can compute the
following:






fi(ai j hY;mi)￿(m j hY) that a will be
played at hY;
the probability pC;f(y j hY) =
P
a2A
p(y j a)￿C;f(a j hY) that y will occur at hY;
the probability pC;f(h
k+1
Y ) that h
k+1






























and player i￿ s expected average discounted payo⁄














Having the players￿set of strategies and payo⁄ functions de￿ned, we denote this
extended repeated game by G1
C (￿). Then an extensive form correlated equilibrium of
G1
Y (￿) extended by C can be de￿ned as a Nash equilibrium of G1
C (￿).
De￿nition 1 An extensive form correlated equilibrium (C;f) of G1
Y (￿) is a pair con-
sisting of an extensive form correlation device C and a strategy pro￿le f such that
the strategy pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium of the extended game induced by the device,
7that is, ui(f j ￿;C) ￿ ui(f0
i;f￿i j ￿;C) for all f0
i : HY ￿ Mi 7! 4(Ai) and all i 2 N.
Further on, we will focus on public correlated equilibria that for each period k
and public history hk
Y yield a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding extended game
from that period on.
For any correlation device C, strategy pro￿le f, and history hY; we denote by
CjhY = ((Mi)i2N;￿jhY ) the correlation device induced by C following hY, where ￿jhY
is the map from HY to M = ￿
i2N
Mi such that ￿jhY (m j h0
Y) = ￿(m j fhY;h0
Yg) for
all m 2 M and h0




n ) the strategy pro￿le induced
by f following hY, where f
jhY
i (ai j h0
Y;mi) = fi(ai j fhY;h0
Yg;mi) for all i 2 N,
mi 2 Mi, ai 2 Ai, and h0
Y 2 HY; by ￿0jhY = ￿jhY (￿ j h0) the probability distribution
on M according to which the extensive form device C = ((Mi)i2N;￿) selects its
recommendations at hY; by f
0jhY
i player i￿ s strategy f
jhY
i (￿ j h0) : Mi 7! 4(Ai) at hY.
Note that C = Cjh0 and f = fjh0.
De￿nition 2 An extensive form correlated equilibrium (C;f) of G1
Y (￿) is called pub-
lic correlated if (CjhY ;fjhY ) is an extensive form correlated equilibrium of G1
Y (￿) for
any hY 2 HY.
Given a strategy pro￿le f and a correlation device C, player i￿ s expected average






p(y j a)￿C;f(a j hY)((1￿￿)￿i(ai;y)+￿ui(f
jfhY ;yg j ￿;C
jfhY ;yg));
The following statement is the one-shot deviation principle for in￿nitely repeated
games with public monitoring and extensive form correlation.
Proposition 1 A pair (C;f) consisting of an extensive form correlation device
((Mi)i2N;￿) and a strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn), fi : HY ￿ Mi 7! 4(Ai), is a
8public correlated equilibrium of G1
Y (￿) if and only if, for any history hY 2 HY, the







i : Mi 7! 4(Ai), form a correlated equilibrium of the game
G
0jhY
Y (￿) = (N;(Ai)i2N;(
X
y2Y
p(y j a)((1 ￿ ￿)￿i(ai;y) + ￿ui(f
jfhY ;yg j ￿;C
jfhY ;yg)))i2N):
Because of discounting, the proof of Proposition 1 reduces to a conventional back-
ward induction argument.
It is useful to note that the revelation principle holds in this setting. An extensive
form correlation device C = ((Mi)i2N;￿) is direct if Mi = Ai for all i 2 N. The
obedient strategy for player i is a map fi from HY ￿Ai to Ai such that fi(ai j hY;ai) =
1 for all hY 2 HY and ai 2 Ai: An extensive form direct correlated equilibrium is just a
map ￿ from HY to 4(A) such that the obedient strategy pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium
of the induced extended game. An extensive form direct correlated equilibrium ￿
of G1(￿) is called public correlated if ￿jhY is an extensive form direct correlated
equilibrium of G1
Y (￿) for any hY 2 HY.
Corollary 1 Every public correlated equilibrium payo⁄ vector of G1
Y (￿) can be at-
tained in a public direct correlated equilibrium of G1
Y (￿).
It follows from the revelation principle for normal form games and Proposition 1.
So further on, we assume that every extensive form correlation device added to G1
Y (￿)
is a direct device.
Now we show that the APS technique can be easily extended to repeated games
with this kind of extensive form correlation. Let V denote the set of feasible and
individually weakly rational payo⁄s of GY = (N;(Ai)i2N;(gi)i2N) and VC(￿) the set
of public correlated equilibrium payo⁄s of G1
Y (￿). It is not di¢ cult to see that every
9perfect public equilibrium strategy pro￿le of G1
Y (￿) can be represented as a public
direct correlated equilibrium of G1
Y (￿).
Let M(￿) denote the set of public correlated equilibrium strategy pro￿les of G1
Y (￿)
and ui(￿jhY ;￿) player i￿ s expected average discounted payo⁄ in a public direct corre-
lated equilibrium ￿ at hY: If ￿ 2 M(￿), then u(￿jhY j ￿) 2 VC(￿) for any hY 2 HY,
and
ui(￿
jhY j ￿) =
X
(a;y)2A￿Y
p(y j a)￿(a j hY)((1￿￿)￿i(ai;y)+￿ui(￿
jfhY ;yg j ￿));i = 1;:::;n:
By de￿nition,
VC(￿) = fv 2 R
n : v = (u1(￿;￿);:::;un(￿;￿)) for some ￿ 2 M(￿)g:
That is, if v 2 VC(￿), there exist a probability distribution ￿ 2 4(A), a function ￿
from Y to VC(￿) such that vi =
P
(a;y)2A￿Y
p(y j a)￿(a)((1 ￿ ￿)￿i(ai;y) + ￿￿i(y)), i =
1;:::;n; and no player has incentive to disobey any possible recommendation by the
device. This observation is key to obtaining a number of powerful characterizations
of VC(￿).
De￿nition 3 Given ￿ 2 (0;1), for any W ￿ Rn, a pair (￿;￿), where ￿ is a probability
distribution on A, ￿ is a function from Y to W, is called C-admissible with respect
to W if, for all ai 2 Ai, a0
















10For W ￿ Rn, we de￿ne
BC(W j ￿) = fv 2 R
n : vi =
X
(a;y)2A￿Y
p(y j a)￿(a)((1￿￿)￿i(ai;y)+￿￿i(y)); i = 1;:::;n;
for some pair (￿;￿) C-admissible w.r.t. Wg.
It is obvious that VC(￿) ￿ BC(VC(￿) j ￿). Following APS, W ￿ Rn is self-generating
if W ￿ BC(W j ￿). If W ￿ Rn is bounded and self-generating, then BC(W j ￿) ￿
VC(￿): It is not di¢ cult to show that VC(￿) = BC(VC(￿) j ￿) and VC(￿) is a compact
set. The proofs of the just mentioned properties are similar to those provided by APS
for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
2.2 Augmented Correlation Devices
We now introduce devices that send players correlated private messages at the be-
ginning of each stage and, after they have moved, publicly inform all of them of the
whole recommended action pro￿le. As a result, public histories also include past
public messages. As we show below, the opportunities provided by such devices are
not con￿ned to correlation and public randomization.
Let dk = (dk
1;:::;dk
n) denote the action pro￿le recommended by the device in pe-
riod k and Hk
D the set of all possible period-k public histories hk
D = (d0;:::;dk￿1;y0;:::;yk￿1):
As before, an extensive form augmented direct correlation device D can be described




D to 4(A). It sends messages to players twice every
period. First, it separately and con￿dentially recommends an action to each player
and then, after the players have moved, it publicly announces the recommended ac-
tion pro￿le. Now the device￿ s recommendations may stochastically depend not only
on previously observed public signals but also on its own past recommendations.
11A strategy for player i is a map fi from HD ￿ Ai to 4(Ai). Let fi(ai j hD;di)
denote the probability that player i will choose action ai according to fi conditional
on hD 2 HD and di 2 Ai. For an extensive form augmented correlation device D
and a strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn), one can compute player i￿ s expected average
discounted payo⁄ ui(f j ￿;D):
De￿nition 4 An extensive form augmented correlated equilibrium (D;f) of G1
Y (￿)
is a pair consisting of an extensive form augmented direct correlation device D and
an obedient strategy pro￿le f such that the strategy pro￿le is a Nash equilibrium of
the extended game induced by the device, that is,
ui(f j ￿;D) ￿ ui(f
0
i;f￿i j ￿;D) for all f
0
i : HD ￿ Ai 7! 4(Ai) and all i 2 N:
De￿nition 5 An extensive form augmented correlated equilibrium (D;f) of G1
Y (￿)
is called public augmented if (DjhD;fjhD) is an extensive form augmented correlated
equilibrium of G1
Y (￿) for any history hD 2 HD.
The following statement describes the recursive structure of a public augmented
equilibrium of G1
Y (￿).
Proposition 2 A pair (D;f); consisting of an extensive form augmented correlation
device ((Ai)i2N;￿D) and an obedient strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn), fi : HD ￿
Ai 7! Ai, is a public augmented equilibrium of G1














p(y j ai;d￿i)￿D(d j hD)((1￿￿)￿i(ai;y)+￿ui(f
jfhD;(d;y)g j ￿;D
jfhD;(d;y)g)
12for all di 2 Ai, ai 2 Ai ￿ fdig, and i 2 N.
We denote by VD(￿) the set of public augmented equilibrium payo⁄s of G1
Y (￿).
The de￿nitions of an admissible pair and the self-generating operator for the case
of augmented correlation are straightforward. Let, for ai 2 Ai; d 2 A; i 2 N; and




p(y j ai;d￿i)((1 ￿ ￿)￿i(ai;y) + ￿￿i(y j d)):
De￿nition 6 Given ￿ 2 (0;1), for any W ￿ Rn, a pair (￿;￿), where ￿ is a probability








for all di 2 Ai, ai 2 Ai ￿ fdig, and i 2 N.
De￿nition 7 For W ￿ Rn, the self-generating operator BD(W j ￿) is de￿ned by
BD(W j ￿) = fv 2 R




for some pair (￿;￿) D ￿ admissible w.r.t. Wg.
As usual, the self-generation property holds: if W is a bounded subset of Rn such
that W ￿ BD(W j ￿), then BD(W j ￿) ￿ VD(￿). It is also not di¢ cult to show
that VD(￿) is a compact subset of Rn: Clearly, disclosing private information at the
end of each period introduces public randomization e⁄ects in the model. Moreover,
augmentation may also contribute to e¢ ciency, which is illustrated in Example 2.
133 Two Examples
In this section, we consider two in￿nitely repeated games with public monitoring. In
Example 1, we show that partial correlation may produce more e¢ cient outcomes
than public randomization in an in￿nitely repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma game with
perfect monitoring. The intuition behind the e¢ ciency improvement is the same as
in Aumann (1974)￿ s Example 2.6. However, here it is applied to an in￿nitely repeated
prisoners￿dilemma game, in which the stage game has a unique corelated equilibrium.
To begin with, we provide some notation for the perfect monitoring case.
The de￿nition of a C￿admissible pair simpli￿es to the following: A pair (￿;￿),
where ￿ is a probability distribution on A, ￿ is a function from A to W, is C-admissible
with respect to W ￿ Rn if, for all ai 2 Ai, a0
i 2 Ai ￿ faig, and i 2 N,
X
a￿i2A￿i









The self-generating operator can be represented as follows:
BC(W j ￿) = fv 2 R
n : v =
X
a2A
￿(a)((1 ￿ ￿)g(a) + ￿￿(a))
for some pair (￿;￿) C-admissible w.r.t. Wg.
In Example 1, the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s is
a proper subset of the set of public correlated equilibrium payo⁄s.
Example 1. The stage game is the following prisoner￿ s dilemma game:
14Player 2
Actions L R
Player 1 U 1;1 ￿b;2
D 2;￿b 0;0
where b = 2
5. Following Stahl (1991), one can show that, if ￿ 2 [b
2; 1
2), the set
VP(￿) of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s is the triangle
T = cof(0;2 ￿ b);(2 ￿ b;0);(0;0)g: Here coX denotes the convex hull of X:
We ￿rst show that T ￿ VC(￿) for all ￿ 2 [b
2; 1
2).
Claim 1 For all ￿ 2 [b
2; 1
2); T ￿ VC(￿).
Proof. Given ￿ 2 [b
2; 1
2), consider the continuation value function ￿ = (￿(U;L);￿(U;R);
￿(D;L);￿(D;R)); ￿(U;L) = ￿(D;R) = (0;0); ￿(U;R) = (
(1￿￿)b
￿ ; 2￿￿b








Player 1 U 1 ￿ ￿;1 ￿ ￿ 0;2 ￿ b
D 2 ￿ b;0 0;0
Its pure strategy Nash equilibria are (U;R), (D;L), and (D;R); so cof(0;2 ￿ b);
(0;0);(2 ￿ b;0)g ￿ VC(￿).
We now show that imperfect correlation can produce more e¢ cient outcomes than
perfect correlation in the repeated game.
Claim 2 As ￿ goes to 1
2 from below, the distance between VC(￿) and (1;1) goes to
zero.
15Proof. Let x 2 (0;1): Suppose that the payo⁄ vector (x;x) can be supported by
a pair (￿;￿); where ￿(U;L) = (x;x), ￿(U;R) = (2 ￿ b;0), ￿(D;L) = (0;2 ￿ b),
￿(D;R) = (0;0); and ￿ = (￿UL;￿UR;￿DL;￿DR) is a probability distribution on A
such that ￿UR = ￿DL > 0; ￿DR = 0. The game is symmetric, so we look at it from
player 1￿ s point of view. The fact that (x;x) can be supported by (￿;￿) means that
x = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿UL + (2 ￿ b)￿UR) + ￿(￿ULx + (2 ￿ b)￿UR); (1)
and the following two incentive constraints hold:
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿UL ￿ ￿URb) + ￿(￿ULx + (2 ￿ b)￿UR) ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿UL; (2)
2(1 ￿ ￿)￿UR ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿UR + ￿￿URx: (3)
Solving (1) for x, we get
x = x(b;￿;￿UR) =




1 ￿ ￿ + 2￿￿UR
:
The constraint (2) implies that




1 ￿ ￿ + 2￿￿UR









￿UR > 1 ￿ ￿UR;
we deduce by continuity that for any ￿xed ￿UR > 0 there exists ￿(￿UR) < 1
2 such
16that (4) holds for all ￿ 2 [￿(￿UR); 1
2). The incentive constraint (3) can be rewritten
as x ￿ 1￿￿
￿ . This inequality obviously holds for all ￿ < 1
2. It is not di¢ cult to see
that x(b;￿(￿UR);￿UR) approaches 1 as ￿UR goes to 0.
Adding a public randomization device to an in￿nitely repeated game is accom-
panied by rede￿ning the notion of public history, with a public history including
not only the history of previously chosen action pro￿les but also the history of past
public messages. As a result, it is easy to ￿nd an example where the set VP(￿) of
subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo⁄s strictly contains the set
VC(￿) of public correlated equilibrium payo⁄s. Moreover, VC(￿) need not be convex
and monotonic in ￿ (Prokopovych and Smith 2004), which comes as no suprise since
the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo⁄s possesses these properties as well.
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, the set of perfect public
equilibrium payo⁄s may be bounded away from the Pareto frontier uniformly in the
discount rates if the signal space is small (Radner et al. 1986). We will show that aug-
mentation, unlike extensive correlation alone, produces e¢ ciency gains in the game.
The fact that players￿future payo⁄s may also depend on the device￿ s recommenda-
tions makes the distinguishability problem (the problem of detecting deviators) less
severe. At the same time, since the device￿ s recommendations are not binding for
players, only realizations of the imperfect public signal may indicate possible devia-
tions.
Example 2. Following Fudenberg et al. (1994), we consider the following re-
peated partnership game. There are two possible output levels, y = 12 and y = 0. If
both players work, the probability that y = 12 is 2
3; if only one works the probability
is 1
3, and if neither works it is 0: Each player￿ s utility is half of total output minus the
disutility of her e⁄ort; work generates a disutility of 3. Then the players￿ s expected
one-period payo⁄s are given in the following table:
17Player 2
Actions L R
Player 1 U 1;1 ￿1;2
D 2;￿1 0;0
where the actions U and L correspond to "work" and the actions R and D to "shirk."
To simplify notation, we assume that the signal space Y consists of two signals b
and s, where the symbol b stands for 12 and s for 0. Then p(b j U;L) = 2
3; p(b j
U;R) = p(b j D;L) = 1
3; and p(b j D;R) = 0: Given ￿ 2 (0;1); we denote by V (￿)
the set of perfect public equilibrium payo⁄s of this game. A reasoning similar to that
provided by Fudenberg and Levine (1994) can be employed to show that the limit
set VL = lim
￿!1
V (￿) is T = cof(0;0);(0;1);(1;0)g; the triangle with the extreme points
(0;0);(0;1); and (1;0):
First we show that, even with an extensive form correlation device C added, the
players￿average discounted equilibrium payo⁄s sum to no more than 1. The proof
of this statement is similar to that provided by Fudenberg et al. (1994) for perfect
public equilibrium payo⁄s.
Claim 3 For all ￿ 2 (0;1); VC(￿) ￿ cof(0;0);(0;1);(1;0)g:
Proof. We ￿rst show that if v = (v1;v2) 2 VC(￿), then v1 + v2 ￿ 1. Let ￿(￿) =
maxfv1 + v2 j (v1;v2) 2 VC(￿)g. By contradiction, assume that ￿(￿) > 1 for some
￿ 2 (0;1): Let v = (v1;v2) 2 VC(￿) be such that v1+v2 = ￿(￿): It can be decomposed
in a C-admissible pair ￿ 2 4( A) and ￿ : Y 7! VC(￿). Then




























￿1(s))) ￿ 0: (6)
Since ￿(￿) > 1, ￿ puts positive probability on the action pro￿le (U;L). Player 1￿ s sec-
ond incentive constraint is omitted because it has no bearing on the below reasoning.









This leads to the conclusion that v1 + v2 ￿ ￿￿(￿); which contradicts the initial as-
sumption.
Adding an extensive form correlation device to the repeated game does not make
available public information richer. Moreover, the signal space is too poor for the
correlation to have any e¢ ciency-improving e⁄ect. At the same time, adding an aug-
mented correlation device to the game improves e¢ ciency because its payo⁄-irrelevant
recommendations enrich public histories, and, as a result, future payo⁄s may depend
on both the history of realized public signals and the history of the device￿ s payo⁄-
irrelevant recommendations.
Claim 4 For all ￿ 2 [3
4;1); the set T = cof(0;0);(0;1);(1;0)g is strictly contained in
VD(￿):
Proof. We ￿rst show that T ￿ VD(￿) for ￿ 2 [3
4;1): Let ￿ 2 [3
4;1) and the continuation




￿ ); ￿(s j U;R) = (0;1),




￿ ); ￿(s j D;L) = (1;0); ￿(b j D;R) = ￿(s j D;R) =
(0;0); and ￿(b j U;L) = ￿(s j U;L) = (0;0):
Player 1￿ s incentive constraints are the following:
￿UL((1 ￿ ￿)(￿1) + ￿(
1
3




+ ￿UR((1 ￿ ￿)(￿1) + ￿(
1
3
￿1(b j U;R) ￿
1
3
￿1(s j U;R))) ￿ 0 (8)
and
￿DL((1 ￿ ￿)1 + ￿(￿
1
3




+ ￿DR((1 ￿ ￿)1 + ￿(￿
1
3
￿1(b j D;R) +
1
3
￿1(s j D;R))) ￿ 0 (9)
Since




the containment T ￿ VD(￿) holds if (￿;￿) is a D￿admissible pair for every ￿ =
(￿UL;￿UR;￿DL;￿DR) 2 4(A) such that ￿UL = 0; which follows straightforwardly
from (8) and (9). Because of symmetry, there is no need to check player 2￿ s incentive
constraints.
Now we show that there exists (x;x) 2 VD(￿)￿T that can be supported by a public
augmented equilibrium. Let x 2 (0;1) and ￿ be such that ￿(b j U;L) = ￿(s j U;L) =




￿ ); ￿(b j D;L) = (0;1);




￿ ); ￿(b j D;R) = ￿(s j D;R) = (0;0): Because of
symmetry, we look only at player 1￿ s payo⁄. It is easy to check that the incentive
constraints (8) and (9) hold for ￿ = (1
3; 1
3; 1
3;0): So, if x is decomposable with respect
to ￿ = (1
3; 1
3; 1




((1 ￿ ￿)1 + ￿x) +
1
3






((1 ￿ ￿)2 + 4(1 ￿ ￿)):





It is clear that 2x > 1 for any ￿ 2 [3
4;1):
The key to the e¢ ciency improvement is the following. If the pro￿le of privately
recommended actions is (U;L); then player 1￿ s deviation to D or player 2￿ s deviation
to R would go unpunished. However, if the pro￿le of privately recommended actions
is (U;R), a severe punishment would follow player 1￿ s deviation to D. Moreover,
after getting the recommendation "play U," player 1 does not know with certainty
the action recommended to player 2, which keeps player 1 from deviating to D:
Therefore, augmentation helps alleviate the e¢ ciency-reducing condition (7). This
condition is also to be blamed for the fact that the maximum value a player can get
in a strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium of the game is much smaller than
one half (Abreu et al. 1991). Even switching to private strategies does not result
in payo⁄s vectors lying outside T (Kandori and Obara 2006a). Though Kandori and
Obara￿ s idea to check the partner￿ s behavior by randomization is present here in its
extreme form: The bad public signal does not cause any punishment if the pro￿le
of privately recommended actions is (U;L): Thus, in the repeated partnership game,
21disclosing private payo⁄-irrelevant messages at the end of each period makes e¢ ciency
improvements possible.
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